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Jews and the British Empire c.1900 
David Feldman  
In the years of high imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century what 
bearing did the British Empire have on the Jews, or Jews on the British Empire? The 
silence of scholarship might lead us to answer ‘not very much’. Concerned with the 
legacy of Jewish emancipation, the dynamics of social integration, the challenge of 
large-scale migration, and the representation of Jewish difference in political 
argument, historians of the Jews have barely touched on the subject. Historians of 
empire, for their part, have had other preoccupations too. Perhaps the identification of 
imperialism with Jewish finance by J. A. Hobson and other radical critics of empire in 
the 1890s and early 1900s, as well as the Jew-baiting rhetoric of some critics, has 
rendered the relationship of Jews to the Empire a difficult problem for later 
generations to address.1  
Yet the subject itself is scarcely hidden from view. If we look at some of the Jewish 
community's central institutions we find they held an imperial dimension. The Chief 
Rabbi was the religious head of the United Hebrew Congregations not merely of 
England or Britain but of the British Empire.2 The Anglo-Jewish pulpit was fulsome in 
its support for empire. In 1897 Queen Victoria's jubilee was celebrated in every 
synagogue in Britain. Here, as in the nation at large, the celebrations delivered an 
imperial message. The Chief Rabbi – Nathan Adler – marvelled that ‘Nothing in the 
history of the world has been more remarkable than the growth and expansion by 
leaps and by bounds, of the prosperity of the Empire, of its population, and of its 
wealth, its commerce and industry’.3 The Rev. Michael Adler, minister at 
Hammersmith Synagogue, surveyed ‘the political and social condition of our 
coreligionists at the present moment in the British Empire’ and found it ‘better than at 
any previous period of the exile’.  
At the Central Synagogue, Israel Abrahams connected the success of Jewish 
emancipation to the practice of toleration that, in his view, was required by successful 
imperial rule. ‘With off-shoots in all countries and climes, embracing under its banner 
men widely differing on race, in religion, and in language, England alone of all the 
                                                 
1 My own book, Englishmen and Jews: Social Relations and Political Culture, 1840–1914, London, 
1994, while it does not entirely ignore imperial themes, provides one illustration of this tendency. Only 
a little more work by literary scholars has focused on the ways Empire figured in representations of 
Jews. See Bryan Cheyette, Constructions of ‘the Jew’ in English Literature 1875–1920, Cambridge, 
1993, pp. 55–94 
2 The inevitable disputes between ministers and their congregations in the colonies were referred to the 
Chief Rabbi in London. In time, some colonial congregations tried to establish their own rabbinical 
court – a Beth Din – but these courts required approval from the Chief Rabbi in London to establish 
their legitimacy. Louis Hermann, The Jews in South Africa, 1930, pp.161, 164; Suzanne D. Rutland, 
Edge of the Diaspora: two Centuries of Jewish Settlement in Australia, second edn, 1997, Rose Bay 
NSW, Australia, pp. 30, 48, 74. 
3 Nathan Adler, Anglo-Jewish Memories, London, 1909, pp. 96–7. 
empires of Europe has grown to understand that national life needs differentiation in a 
union of many forces on behalf of progress and righteousness.’4 
The Board of Deputies of British Jews, the body that represented Jewry to the British 
government, tried to influence colonial affairs when it deemed Jewish interests were at 
stake. In 1902, when the Cape of Good Hope Immigration Act required immigrants to 
sign their name in a European language but did not count Yiddish among the 
European languages, the Board made representations to the Cape government.5 The 
Jewish Chronicle was the pre-eminent communal newspaper, and provided the 
community with one widely-circulated representation of itself. It is significant that at 
the turn of the century it carried a regular column titled ‘Colonial and Foreign News’ 
as well as another which presented ‘Jottings from South Africa’. The Jewish Year 
Book, first published in 1896, fulfilled a similar role defining the parameters of the 
community and it too acknowledged the community's imperial dimension as it listed 
synagogues, associations and personages across the Colonies. But it is not only in the 
official and quasi-official institutions of Anglo-Jewry that we can find an imperial 
presence. Among the Jewish friendly and benefit societies in the East End of London 
there were lodges and associations named after Major General Baden Powell or which 
gave an ‘imperial’ prefix to their name.6 
If we move from institutions to individuals we can see that the empire offered careers 
for English Jews as well as for non-Jews. Many, of course, emigrated permanently. 
However, others, such as Henry Herman Gordon returned. Gordon was born in 
Germany of Russian Jewish parents. His father came to London to serve as a minister 
and the young Henry, having been educated at the Jews’ Free School and at 
Cambridge University, went to India as a railway engineer before returning at the turn 
of the century to become a member of Stepney Borough Council.7 Among the clergy, 
this sort of circulation was not unusual. The colonies provided congregations for 
underemployed ministers and, by the start of the twentieth century, colonial 
congregations themselves provided ministers for congregations in Britain. Julius 
Goldstein, the minister at the North London Synagogue in Dalston, had been born in 
Australia.8 The most striking instance of this sort of movement occurred in 1912 when 
Dr J. H. Hertz, who had been the Rabbi of Witwatersrand Hebrew Congregation, was 
appointed Chief Rabbi in succession to Nathan Adler. Hertz first came to notice in 
Britain on account of his noisy support for the British cause in the months preceding 
the Boer War. For his pains he was expelled from Johannesburg. After Hertz had 
settled in the Cape, the British High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner appointed him 
to his advisory council. A decade later, Milner's recommendation, and his friendship 
with Lord Rothschild, assisted Hertz in his candidacy for the vacant Chief Rabbinate.9  
Jews were also involved in fighting for and administering the empire. Between 1893 
and 1903 the number of Jews holding a commission doubled and those in the ranks 
                                                 
4 Both quotations are cited in William D. Rubinstein, A History of the Jews in the English-speaking 
World: Great Britain, Basingstoke, 1996, p. 18. 
5 Charles Herbert Lewis Emanuel, A Century and a Half of Jewish History, extracted from the Minute 
Books of the London Committee of Deputies of the British Jews, 1910, p. 158. 
6 National Archives, FS 4 29. 
7 Parliamentary Papers 1903 IX, Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, qq. 17,594–6. 
8 Jewish Year Book, 1900–01, 1900, p. 273. 
9 Geoffrey Alderman, The Jewish Community in British Politics, Oxford, 1983, p. 88. 
increased sixfold.10 The Nathan family evidently looked on the British Empire as a 
sort of family concern. In the first decade of the twentieth century Sir Matthew Nathan 
served as Governor of the Gold Coast, Hong Kong and Natal. One brother, Sir 
Nathaniel Nathan, was Attorney-General and Chief Justice in Trinidad, and a second 
brother, Sir Robert Nathan, rose to become Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India 
and Officiating Chief Secretary to the Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam. 
Hermann Kisch entered the Indian Civil Service in 1873 where he passed through a 
series of posts finally becoming Postmaster-General of Bengal. At home, Sir Lionel 
Abrahams became Permanent Assistant Under-Secretary at the India Office. Indeed, 
he held this post at the same time as Edwin Montagu was Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for India.11  
Empire, of course, was also a field for the pursuit of profit. The house of Rothschild 
concerned itself mainly with loans to governments and public bodies. However, in the 
1890s it became heavily involved in diamond and gold mining on the Rand. When 
Alfred Beit and Julius Wernher floated Rand Mines in February 1893, Rothschilds 
were allotted 27,000 of the 100,000 shares.12 The scandals that beset the Edwardian 
Jewish plutocracy also illustrate Jews’ involvement in the empire as a money-making 
enterprise. The Marconi scandal of 1912, it is well known, centred on the allegation 
that four Liberal cabinet ministers stood to profit from a contract awarded to the 
English Marconi Company. Two of the cabinet ministers in question – Sir Rufus 
Isaacs and Herbert Samuel – were Jews. The head of the English Marconi Company 
was Geoffrey Isaacs, the brother of Sir Rufus. However, what is less often noted is 
that the prize Marconi had won was a contract to construct an empire-wide chain of 
wireless stations. In the Indian Silver Scandal, which broke in 1912, Ernest Franklin, a 
Jewish merchant banker and partner in the firm of Samuel Montagu suggested to Sir 
Felix Schuster – the chairman of the finance committee of the Council of India – that 
his company should purchase £5m of silver for the Indian government and so 
circumvent speculators who might drive up the price. This was an unusual 
arrangement. Normally, the India Office purchased its silver through the Bank of 
England. The civil servant who transacted the business was Lionel Abrahams while, 
as we have seen, Edwin Montagu was a minister in the India Office and his cousin, 
Stuart Samuel, was both a partner in Samuel Montagu and Co. and Liberal MP for 
Whitechapel. Critics detected impropriety and a Jewish plot to use public service for 
personal gain. Montagu and Samuel were both exonerated. But whatever the role of 
family and religious connection in the affair, the capacity of empire to provide 
opportunities for some Jews to pursue profit for themselves and their firms is beyond 
dispute.13  
But it is not only at these elevated levels of wealth and influence that the British 
Empire influenced the course of Anglo-Jewish history. In 1879 the Jewish Board of 
Guardians, the body chiefly concerned with the relief of the Jewish poor in London, 
established an emigration committee. The largest numbers assisted by this committee 
were either repatriated to Eastern Europe or helped onward to the United States. But a 
                                                 
10 Cecil Roth, ‘The Jews in the Defence of Britain’, Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of 
England, 1939–45, p. 26. 
11 Rubinstein, History of the Jews, pp. 198–9 
12 Niall Ferguson, The World's Banker: the History of the House of Rothschild, London, 1998, pp. 877–
92. 
13 On these scandals see Colin Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876–1939, 1979, pp. 70–9. 
significant minority were sent on to Australia and South Africa. The Poor Jews’ 
Temporary Shelter, a charity located in the East End that took in new arrivals, was 
also a staging-post for Jews travelling from Lithuania to South Africa.14 But even for 
those East European Jews who settled in England the empire was significant. Most 
found work in the clothing trading and here the export market was important, 
particularly at the bottom end of the trade to which the least skilled, most recent 
arrivals gravitated. The value of exports in clothing and apparel rose from £3.7m in 
1881 to £5.1m in 1901, much of it shipped to the empire. In the East End of London 
the cheapest tailoring work performed by the Jews and destined for Africa was known 
as the ‘kaffir trade’.15 Imperial imports too, such as the trade in ostrich feathers, were 
the source of new Jewish fortunes both through farming ostriches in the Cape, and 
processing and trading the plumes in London.16  
This quick survey of some the ways that Anglo-Jewish history was imbricated with 
the history of the British Empire does not depend on fresh archival research. Little of 
it is new. What is new, however, is the emergent tendency of a few historians to 
examine in detail one or other of these fragments or to focus centrally on the 
interaction of Jews and empire.17 Why, we might ask, is this happening now? In part, 
no doubt, this move is one response to the contemporary political and cultural 
conflicts that engage us. In Britain the legacy of empire has figured in debates 
provoked by racialized conflicts in public life as well as in debates over the meaning 
and possibility of a multicultural society. Scholars have engaged in these debates and 
it is not surprising that academics involved in Jewish studies should seek to participate 
in them as well.18 There are other dimensions too. Current debates over globalization 
and transnationalism promote questions about the international dimensions of the 
Jewish past. In this respect the British Empire presents one promising field for 
research.19 However, the current interest in the junction of Jews and empire is also a 
response to the arrival, development and institutionalization of post-colonial studies in 
a wide range of disciplines and interdisciplinary fields, including history. This, it is 
easy to imagine, has presented a particular challenge to scholarship on modern Jewry 
which is strongest in the United States and in Israel. The creation of the Jewish state 
and its continuing conflict with the Palestinians means that Jews in Israel and their 
supporters elsewhere figure in postcolonial discourse as the legatees of a dead British 
empire as well as a prop for a new American empire. These are connections made by 
no less a figure than Edward Said, one of the founding figures of postcolonial 
studies.20 In this light it is both timely and pertinent to ask what difference can 
                                                 
14 Vivian Lipman, A Century of Social Service, 1859–1959. The Jewish Board of Guardians, London, 
1959, pp. 97–100; Aubrey. Newman ‘The Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter: Directed Migration’, in 
Patterns of Migration, 1850–1914, ed. Aubrey Newman and Stephen Massil, London, 1996, pp. 175–
86. 
15 Feldman, Englishmen and Jews, p. 191. 
16 Sara Stein, ‘Falling into Feathers’, Journal of Modern History, forthcoming. 
17 The role of Southampton University's Parkes Institute for the Study of Jewish/non-Jewish Relations 
has been important in this respect. See http://www.parkes.soton.ac.uk/pastevents.htm 
18 See the aims of the Parkes Institute http://www.parkes.soton.ac.uk/ahrc.htm 
19 Stein, ‘Falling into Feathers’; Abigail Green ‘The British Empire and the Jews: an Imperialism of 
Human Rights?’, Past and Present, forthcoming 2008. 
20 Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, London, 1992 
postcolonial studies make to our understanding of the Jewish past? And, conversely, 
what happens to postcolonial studies when they encompass the Jews?21  
One starting point for postcolonial analysis has been its insistence that we yoke 
histories of exploration and conquest, colonization and coercion, dispossession and 
military force, repression and resistance beyond Europe to our understanding of 
history and culture in the colonial metropole. As Catherine Hall helpfully expresses 
the point: ‘Colonialism made both colonisers and colonised, and postcolonial forms of 
analysis attempt to understand that process’.22 One result has been a burst of 
scholarship that has both asserted and explored the impact of empire on metropolitan 
society and culture. In the case of British history this writing has reshaped the 
parameters of debate on the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.23  
When this work brings together metropole and colony within the same analytical field 
it not only broadens our understanding of European history it also demands a 
revaluation of that history. Anthropologists and literary critics, geographers and 
historians have asked how colonialism made Europeans. Starting from the premise 
that knowledge is a discursive field whose significance is embedded within systems of 
power, many scholars have examined colonialism not only as a military, economic 
and institutional force but also as a phenomenon that operated within European 
culture. This has led some writers not only to point out that colonialism and racism 
were important facets of European modernity but to suggest that European culture and 
politics is fatally compromised by its colonial and racist past. Robert Young, for 
example, simply asserts, ‘postcolonial cultural analysis has been concerned with the 
elaboration of theoretical structures that contest the previous dominant western way of 
seeing things’.24 In a similar vein Homi Bhabha insists that ‘metropolitan histories of 
civitas cannot be conceived without evoking the savage colonial antecedents of the 
idea of civility’, and he asks his readers to ‘rethink the profound and collusive 
"liberal" sense of community’ and to question ‘the language of rights and obligations, 
so central to the modern myth of a people’.25 Some historians write in similar terms. 
Antoinette Burton tells us ‘the "Enlightenment promise" was historically unrealised 
for women citizens as for colonial subjects of all persuasions and allegiances’.26 These 
are not isolated voices. Frederick Cooper recently has pointed to the tendency to turn 
the centuries of ‘European colonization overseas into a critique of the Enlightenment, 
democracy or modernity’.27 
                                                 
21 On this see Orientalism and the Jews, ed. Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, Lebanon NH, 
2005. 
22 Catherine Hall, Cultures of Empire: a Reader, Manchester, 2000, p. 3. 
23 For example, A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 
1660–1840, ed. Kathleen Wilson, Cambridge, 2004; After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and 
through the Nation, ed. Antoinette Burton, 2003; Hall, Cultures of Empire. 
24 Robert Young, Postcolonialism: a very short Introduction, Oxford, 2003, p. 4. 
25 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 1994, p. 175. 
26 Antoinette Burton, ‘The Unfinished Business of Colonial Modernities’, in Gender, Sexuality and 
Colonial Modernity, ed. Antoinette Burton, London, 1999, p. 4. There are other voices, however, 
among postcolonial historians. See, for example, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe: 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton, NJ, 2000, p. 4. 
27 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge and History, Berkeley CA, 2005, p. 
15. See too Neil Lazarus, ‘Introducing Postcolonial Studies’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Postcolonial Literary Studies, ed. Neil Lazarus, Cambridge, 2004, p. 13. 
At the same time as this essay examines the interaction of Jews with the British 
Empire at the start of the twentieth century, it also explores both the reach and some 
limitations to this widespread analysis of the colonial past. The relationship between 
Jews and modernity was a concern for both Jews and non-Jews as they tried to shape 
and comprehend the relationship of Jews to the British Empire. These debates and 
projects allow us to convert some of the preoccupations of present-day theory into a 
historical question. How, at the beginning of the twentieth century, did people 
conceive of the relation between Jews, empire and modernity?  
On 12 October 1899 the contentious relations between the British government and the 
Republic of the Transvaal descended to a state of war. Ostensibly, the British were 
fighting to secure political rights for ‘Uitlanders’ – settlers who had been attracted to 
the Rand following the discovery of gold there in 1886. The war was a shambles. It 
led to military embarrassment, it was costly and it led to Britain's isolation 
internationally. Only in the spring of 1900 did the war turn decisively in Britain's 
favour, though the Afrikaners’ guerrilla tactics managed to embarrass the world's pre-
eminent empire for another two years.28 The war divided the Liberal party. Many 
Liberals were critical of the diplomacy that had led to the war and of the methods by 
which it was fought but most supported the government once the Boers had invaded 
the Cape Colony. Nevertheless, within parliament a group of forty-five MPs (reduced 
to thirty after the 1900 ‘khaki’ election) sustained their consistent and unqualified 
opposition to the war and a vociferous minority of Liberals, radicals and socialists in 
the country supported them.29  
The view that the war was a Jewish war was commonplace among its opponents. In 
February 1900 John Burns declaimed in the House of Commons that ‘the British army 
which used to be for all good causes, the Sir Galahad of history, has become the 
janissary of the Jews ... Wherever we examine, there is the financial Jew operating; 
directing, inspiring the agonies that that have led to this war’. Later the same year, the 
Trade Union Congress passed a resolution condemning the war as one ‘to secure the 
gold fields of South Africa for cosmopolitan Jews most of whom have no patriotism 
and no country’. Justice, the newspaper of the Social Democratic Federation, blamed 
the war on ‘unscrupulous Jewish financiers’ and the ‘Semitic-capitalist press’.30  
The connection between the war and finance should not lead us to think that all these 
critics connected the war to the logic of capitalism and in this way to modernity. Most 
of these writers and speakers expressed a longstanding radical critique of imperialism 
that associated empire, not with modernity and progress, but with aristocracy and with 
the decay of representative government. In this vein, Francis W. Hirst, Gilbert Murray 
and J. L. Hammond feared that ‘possibilities are brought near to us which may involve 
in vital danger even a commonwealth so massively stable as our own’. A. R. Wallace 
MP, a member of the South African Conciliation Committee, asserted, ‘every triumph 
of expansionism is a rebuff to democratic Liberalism. Expansionist imperialism means 
                                                 
28 Bill Nasson, The South African War, 1899–1902, London, 1999. 
29 J. W. Auld, ‘The Liberal Pro-Boers’, Journal of British Studies, May 1975, p. 80; see too The 
Anatomy of an Antiwar Movement, ed. Steven Koss, Chicago, 1973. 
30 Parliamentary Debates, fourth series, vol. 78, 6 Feb. 1900, col. 785; Justice, 7 Oct. 1899, pp. 4–5; 
Auld, ‘The Liberal Pro-Boers’, pp. 106–7; Claire Hirshfield, ‘The British Left and the "Jewish 
Conspiracy": a Case Study of Modern Anti-Semitism’, Jewish Social Studies, spring 1981, pp. 98–9. 
more despotism abroad and more aristocratic recrudescence at home’.31 For these 
writers and speakers, the financiers had thrown in their lot with the traditional 
governing class and so had aligned themselves with the radicals’ customary gallery of 
rogues: John Burns complained ‘the financial elements, the military caste, the society 
set have dictated African policy too long with fatal results’.32  
The most elaborate denunciation of the war as a Jewish war was made by J. A. 
Hobson, first in a series of newspaper and magazine articles and then in his book The 
War in South Africa: its Causes and Effects, published in 1900. Here Hobson 
confessed ‘it is difficult to state the truth about our doings in South Africa without 
seeming to appeal to the ignominious passion of the Judenhetze’.33 But as we know 
Hobson was not deterred. He pointed to the ‘practical paramountcy’ exercised by 
financiers, the recognized leaders of whom were foreign Jews, over the economic 
interests of the Transvaal. The development of the mining industry, he argued, meant 
they required the constant aid of the State to control the labour supply, mineral rights, 
railway tariffs and trade barriers. It was for this reason that the war was being fought. 
We are fighting, he concluded, ‘to place a small international oligarchy of 
mineowners and speculators in power at Pretoria’.34  
As Peter Cain has argued, Hobson's understanding of imperialism in general and of 
the South African war in particular was original in ways that remain hidden if we 
focus only on the ways in which Jews and finance figure in his analysis. For Hobson, 
imperialism was not a malign growth generated by traditional elites and their allies, it 
was an outgrowth of capitalist society itself. By 1898 Hobson had come to the view 
that the grossly unequal distribution of property led to excess savings that found an 
outlet in foreign investment and international trade that in turn promoted 
imperialism.35 In his commentaries on the war in South Africa Hobson did not pursue 
this emphasis on under-consumption and the domestic roots of imperialism, though he 
returned to the theme in his influential study Imperialism, published in 1902. In 
writing about South Africa Hobson focused instead on the power of finance 
capitalism. But here too, Hobson insisted on the modernity of the phenomenon. In his 
essay ‘Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa’, published in the Contemporary 
Review in 1900, Hobson set out the broader context of events. ‘The full significance 
of this evil business in South Africa is only understood when it is recognised as a most 
dramatic instance of the play of modern forces which are worldwide in their scope and 
revolutionary in their operations.’ These were ‘international capitalism and 
imperialism’ and the interplay between the two.36  
The modernity of the phenomenon was emphasized further when Hobson turned to 
explain how the group of international financiers imposed their will on the nation. 
Hobson's emphasis on Jewish ownership of the press in South Africa and in London 
was less innovative than his use of the work of the French psychologist and sociologist 
                                                 
31 Francis W. Hirst, John L. Hammond, Gilbert Murray, Liberalism and the Empire, 1900, p. xvi; Peter 
Cain, Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism and Finance, 1887–1938, Oxford, 2002, p. 
88. 
32 Parliamentary Debates, fourth series, vol. 78, 6 Feb. 1900, col. 783 
33 J. A. Hobson, The War in South Africa, 1900, p. 189 
34 Hobson, War in South Africa, pp. 190–6. 
35 Cain, Hobson and Imperalism, pp. 72–6. 
36 J. A. Hobson, ‘Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa’, Contemporary Review, January 1900, p. 
1. 
Gustave le Bon. Le Bon's La psychologie des foules was first published in 1895 and 
translated into English a year later. Paradoxically, Le Bon proposed that crowds were 
not only a feature of modernity but, in their behaviour, were also atavistic expressing 
‘the unconscious needs and aspirations of the race’.37 In The Psychology of Jingoism, 
published in 1901, Hobson acknowledged Le Bon's work. He characterized jingoism 
as ‘primitive passion, modified and intensified by certain conditions of modern 
civilisation’, namely, the degenerative effects of urban life. City life, he argued, 
debilitated individual rational judgment and created a populace that craved excitement 
and sensation. This was the setting in which the mob could be manipulated by the 
yellow press and the music hall to produce support for race domination and an 
imperial war. Here Hobson gave a decisively modern twist to the time-honoured 
radical lament that empire corroded political liberty and civic virtue.38 In short, what 
was innovative in Hobson's writings between 1898 and 1902 was his association of 
empire with modernity, and in 1900 the Jews were right there at the heart of it.  
In general, it was not the modernity of empire but the modernity of Jewish 
emancipation that framed the Anglo-Jewish response to the Boer War. At the core of 
Jewish emancipation was the Jews’ admission to citizenship on terms equal with non-
Jews. There was, of course, an implicit assumption here: namely, that Jews had the 
capacity to act as citizens or subjects and that their particular practices, beliefs and 
aspirations did not disqualify them from doing so. Opponents of Jewish emancipation, 
of course, and later anti-Jewish polemicists contended just the opposite. In the words 
of Goldwin Smith they claimed that Jews could not be patriots.39 
It was in this context of recurrent if intermittent debate on the Jews that Nathan Adler 
preached a sermon at the North London Synagogue on 4 November 1899 in which he 
loudly aligned religious doctrine with imperial patriotism. He pointed out that while, 
for Jews, the aspiration for peace was second only to their belief in the unity of God it 
was fully recognized in Jewish teachings that ‘certain wars are inevitable’, and this 
war to sustain the interests of ‘England's sons in distant lands’ was just such a conflict. 
The Jewish Chronicle reported prominently the numbers of Jewish volunteers, printed 
pages full of photographs of Jews in uniform and reported whenever a Jew was 
mentioned in dispatches. It calculated that the casualty rate among Jewish troops was 
nearly double the losses among the troops as a whole. According to the newspaper 
these figures attested to the exceptional ‘zeal and courage’ of Jewish troops.40 Military 
service in defence of empire was both vindication and the highest expression of 
Jewish emancipation. The newspaper editorialized that ‘no finer object lesson has 
been displayed to the world of the success which waits upon a policy of wise 
toleration and justice’. This view was repeated in sections of the immigrant press too. 
Der Yidisher Ekspres, a voice of religious orthodoxy and of political Zionism, urged 
its readership that ‘Jews now have the opportunity to show thanks to the country 
which has taken them in and given them freedom’.41 Alongside these declarations, 
                                                 
37 Daniel Pick, Faces of Degeneration: a European Disorder, Cambridge, 1989, p. 91. 
38 J. A. Hobson, The Psychology of Jingoism, 1901, p. 2. On Jews and the press see The War in South 
Africa, pp. 215–27. 
39 On Goldwin Smith and the Jews see Feldman, Englishmen and Jews, pp. 90–3. It is significant that in 
1898 Reynolds News repeated parts of Smith's argument; specifically, that the Jews are an Asian people 
who worship a tribal god. Hirshfield, ‘The British Left and the "Jewish Conspiracy" ’, p. 101. 
40 Jewish Chronicle, 23 March 1900, p. 17. 
41 Der Yidisher Ekspres, 5 Jan. 1900, p. 2; see too J. Jung, Champions of Orthodoxy, 1974, p. 59. 
however, there was in both newspapers an undercurrent of uneasy concern that at any 
moment emancipation might be brought into question.42  
Jewish emancipation, its legacies and anxieties, created a structure within which 
English Jews responded to the politics of empire. The British Empire provided a field 
of activity in which Jews were able to justify their emancipation. At the same time, as 
we have seen, radical opponents of imperial policy vivified criticisms of the Jews as a 
malign and self-interested minority. This criticism in turn reinforced the anxieties that 
led Jews to believe that they had to justify themselves. The demands of empire and of 
emancipation were two of the fundamental elements that framed the politics of Jewish 
integration at the beginning of the twentieth century. A third, and equally significant 
element, was the existence of more than five million Jews in the Russian Empire and 
Romania: here what was important was both the conditions of their life in eastern 
Europe and also the rising number of East European Jews – two million between 1880 
and 1914 – who emigrated to the United States, Britain, the Cape, Argentine and 
Palestine. For East European Jewry also collided with the politics of the British 
Empire.  
Most obviously, the campaign for the Aliens Act, a campaign for legislation to stem 
the flow of Jewish immigrants to Britain, expressed imperial imperatives. It was, 
perhaps, the most successful synthesis of imperialism and social reform. When the 
Liberal imperialist Lord Rosebery set out his vision of the imperial future in 1893 he 
stated,  
if there is one certainty in the world it is this – that with the growth of 
emigration and the continual closing of the confines of States to the destitute 
emigrants of other countries, there is no country in the world that will not be 
compelled to reconsider its position with regard to pauper immigration, unless 
it wishes permanently to degrade the status and condition of its own working 
classes.43  
 
What Rosebery set out in decorous and general terms, Henry Norman MP expressed in 
more particular and offensive language. He wanted ‘to see at the mouth of our great 
river a notice erected in unmistakeable terms, "No rubbish shot here", this is England, 
the heart of the Empire’.44  
Proposals to restrict immigration from eastern Europe first arose as one response to 
the unemployment and riots that marked winters in London in the mid 1880s. The 
early advocates of restriction – Arnold White in Problems of a Great City and John 
Burnett, the labour correspondent of the Board of Trade – came to focus on the issue 
as a corollary of their pre-existing interest in supporting emigration to the British 
colonies. Even at this point, therefore, the imperial dimension was significant. But 
after 1900 this was still more the case. The immigration issue had faded in the 1890s 
but it re-emerged in 1900, stimulated by an interaction of the local housing crisis in 
the East End of London and the crisis of imperial confidence occasioned by the war in 
South Africa. The poor stature and physical condition of volunteers to the army 
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seemed both to confirm fears that the national stock was degenerating in the face of 
city life, and to dramatise the urgent need to attend to the health of the working classes 
if the nation was to produce a race capable of defending the empire. In this light the 
annual immigration of thousands of Russian Jews was unwelcome. The immigrants 
were represented as unskilled, physically feeble, but resilient and willing to work for a 
pittance. The language of national efficiency in the cause of empire was employed by 
street orators in the East End, Conservative Members of Parliament and candidates, 
and by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons. These advocates of an Aliens 
Act to restrict immigration aligned their cause with other reforms designed to adjust to 
a world in which Britain's imperial pre-eminence was now being challenged. Germany 
and the United States, Britain's key competitors, they pointed out, had introduced laws 
restricting immigration. The advocates of free immigration, they claimed, were 
sentimentalists, out of date, hanging on to inappropriate ideals and unwilling to face 
new realities.45 
This accusation was only a partial truth. In these years there was a growing tendency 
for English Jews to defend free immigration in imperial terms. In effect, this meant a 
shift from a focus on the work ethic and Smilesian virtues of the male immigrants, to 
the sturdy physique, keen intelligence and loyal patriotism of their English-born 
children.46 This re-evaluation of the immigrants can be traced to the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Physical Deterioration in 1904. The creation of the committee was a 
direct response to the condition of volunteers during the Boer War. One member, 
Colonel Fox, gathered evidence in the East End of London, asking head-teachers their 
opinion of the children of Russian, Polish and Romanian Jews. He reported, ‘all 
agreed that they were of good physique, that they were of higher intelligence than our 
children, and that they were better fed by their mothers, who were more thrifty, and 
understood the art of feeding and bringing up the children much better than the 
English mothers’.47 Indeed, the child-rearing skills of Jewish mothers were much 
praised by the committee. This was particularly important because the committee 
witnessed a significant victory of environmentalists over eugenists. It was not the 
determinations of heredity but the contingencies of social conditions that produced 
degeneracy.48 Above all, the Committee's report highlighted the importance of 
nutrition among children. One outcome was the legislation in 1906 that provided free 
school meals to children from poor families. General Sir Frederick Maurice, who had 
been instrumental in revealing the poor health of volunteers, praised Jewish mothers 
for the greater length of time they breast-fed their children. Of course, male virtue 
underpinned female good conduct. The figure of the hardworking Jew was used to 
berate the British working man. Jewish husbands, it was said, only reluctantly sent 
their wives to work, whereas their Gentile counterparts were happy to loaf around and 
live off their wives’ earnings. The implication was clear: if only the British working 
man were more like his Jewish counterpart, the safer the empire would be. Empire had 
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become central not only to the assault on Jewish immigrants but also to their 
defence.49 
Thus far we have examined the ways in which the British Empire, Jewish 
emancipation and both the presence and shadow of Russian Jewry, set the terms for 
the interpolation of Jews in British political controversy at the onset of the twentieth 
century. All these elements came together in August 1903 in a plan to establish a 
Jewish settlement in British East Africa. Here, in a territory that was sometimes 
imagined as the size of Ireland and sometimes as equivalent to Yorkshire, the Jews 
would enjoy something like ‘Home Rule’: domestic self-government, within the 
British Empire.50 The plan was the outcome of negotiations between Theodor Herzl, 
the Zionist leader, Leopold Greenberg, his lieutenant in Britain, on one side, and the 
Foreign Office on the other.  
On 14 August 1903, Sir Clement Hill, head of the Africa section at the Foreign Office, 
wrote to Greenberg to inform him that Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, would 
entertain favourably proposals for a settlement in East Africa in which Jews would be 
able to observe their national customs, if the Zionists and the British government 
could agree on a site. The letter was timed so that Herzl would be able to read its 
contents to the Sixth Zionist Congress that was due to meet in Basle at the end of the 
month. The offer, or more precisely Herzl's favourable consideration of the offer, 
proved deeply divisive among Zionists. A large part of the Congress supported the 
argument that Zionists had no business pursuing any goal other than a Jewish national 
home in or near Palestine. In the words of Moses Gaster, the haham, the religious 
head, of Britain's sephardi Jews, ‘Zionism is not called upon to provide temporary 
measures of relief’. Ultimately, however, Herzl won majority support for a 
commission of inquiry into the British proposition.51  
The British offer of a piece of East Africa originated in informal conversations in 
April and May 1903 between the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, and first 
Herzl and then Greenberg. Initially, in April 1903, Herzl had rejected Chamberlain's 
suggestion.52 However, two crucial events operated to change his mind. First, there 
was news in mid May of the horrific pogrom at Kishiniev, the capital of Bessarabia, 
that had occurred at Easter and, second, the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration 
prepared the report which eventually it submitted in August. According to the official 
reports the events at Kishiniev left forty-nine dead, 500 injured and 2,000 families 
rendered homeless. It was not merely the barbarity of events in Kishiniev that had an 
impact on Jews, but also the apparent complicity of the Russian authorities in the 
slaughter and mayhem. At that moment, the idea that there could be a liberal solution 
to the Jewish problem in Russia required Herculean optimism.53 At the same time, it 
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was a foregone conclusion that the Royal Commission would recommend a measure 
of restriction. These events provided the terms in which Herzl presented the British 
offer to the Zionist Congress. ‘The countries to which ... immigration has hitherto 
been chiefly directed have begun to close their doors while, or because, Jewish 
distress in Eastern Europe is on the increase.’54  
Herzl had been a witness before the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration. Here 
he had connected the spread and development of the Jewish problem in western 
Europe to the impact of immigration from the east. He quoted from his book Der 
Judenstaat, published in 1896. ‘The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in 
perceptible numbers. Where it does not exist it is carried by Jews in the course of their 
migrations. We naturally move to those places where we are not persecuted, and there 
our presence produces persecution.’ In 1903 he was able to tell his interlocutors that 
he saw this process currently at work in France, in the United States and in Britain.55 
The English Zionist Israel Zangwill agreed. Anti-Semitism, he observed, was 
beginning to appear in the countries associated with freedom. The solution, they 
argued, was to provide the Jews with a legally recognized home. Ideologists of Jewish 
emancipation such as the journalist Lucien Wolf maintained that anti-Semitism was, 
as Wolf wrote in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘a mere atavistic revival of the Jew-
hatred of the middle ages’. Zionists such as Zangwill echoed this when they said that 
‘anti-Semitism was a survival from the dark ages’. But, Zangwill argued, anti-
Semitism was more than this; it was also an authentic product of the modern world, 
fuelled by ‘commercial jealousy’ and ‘the crude logic of Demos and demagogues’.56  
Israel Zangwill was by this time a novelist and playwright, popular both in Britain, 
where he lived, and in the United States.57 He was a whole-hearted advocate of Jewish 
settlement in East Africa. His speeches and journalism on the subject provide an 
illuminating instance of the ways in which the politics of emancipation, empire and 
Russian Jewry all came together in reactions to the East Africa offer, one inflecting 
the other. First, Zangwill was glad to align the cause of Zionism with the interests of 
the British Empire. In part, this was because the East Africa offer meant that the 
world's pre-eminent power had recognized the Zionist Congress and was willing to 
deal with it. In part, too it was because he was a British imperialist as well as a 
Zionist. Zangwill pointed out that the British Empire was in its infancy and though 
vast on the map its white colonists numbered just twelve millions.58 
The attraction was not only colonization but also commerce, profit and modernity. 
According to Zangwill, the Zionist answer to these problems was in tune with the new 
times. In his 1899 lecture on Zionism, Zangwill set forth his vision of modernity. ‘The 
world's childhood is passing, with all it charming fantastic visions of fairies and 
fiends, and even in Jerusalem Whitman's "years of the modern, years of the 
unperformed", must have their tardy turn.’ ‘Steam and electricity must transform the 
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problem of Israel’, he announced.59 Zangwill delighted in the advanced 
communications that, he imagined, the East African highlands enjoyed. The land was 
connected to the world beyond by regular steamers on Lake Victoria, by the telegraph 
and most important by the railway. The railway line from Mombasa had yet to make a 
profit. What the country needed was an influx of Jews to render East Africa as 
prosperous and profitable as the Cape.60  
But if this was one dimension of Zangwill's enthusiasm for East Africa it was not the 
only one. In April 1905, as the Zionist movement retreated from the East Africa offer, 
Zangwill founded the Jewish Territorial Organisation to continue its pursuit. In doing 
so he pointed to ‘the vital needs of the Jewish people at the present time’. He told his 
audience in Manchester:  
A few months ago you might have seen our prisoners of the Pale celebrate 
their feast of Chanucah, their Thanksgiving or Independence Day. The irony of 
it! These downtrodden cringing victims of the Ghetto celebrating the victory of 
Judas Maccabeus. ... What a shadow-world the Jew lives in! Is it not about 
time Rip van Winkle woke up and took stock of things and himself?  
 
Since the land of Israel was unobtainable, ‘any territory which was Jewish’, Zangwill 
argued, ‘under a Jewish flag would save the Jews’ body and the Jews’ soul’.61  
In fact, well before Zangwill made this speech the East Africa proposal had ceased to 
be attainable. By the end of 1903 neither the Foreign Office nor the Colonial Office 
nor the British High Commissioner in East Africa could muster any enthusiasm for the 
project. But before accounting for this turn we need first to ask why the British 
government had entertained the proposal in the first place. It is at this point that the 
history of Zionism collides with the history of colonialism and specifically with the 
history of expropriation and settlement. Earl Percy, Parliamentary Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, was explicit on this point when the matter was debated in Parliament 
in 1904. When the offer was made to the Zionists, he explained,  
There was a great dearth of applications from settlers for land in East Africa. It 
had been stated over and over again in debates on the financial position of the 
Protectorates that if they ever were to pay their way and if this country was 
ever to get back anything like value for the vast sums that had been expended 
on these territories, the first requisite was to attract settlers and capital to the 
country.62  
 
Above all, the British government was anxious to recoup the £5m it had invested 
building the railway from Mombasa to Nairobi and then on to Lake Victoria, and this 
was to be achieved by the allocation of land to farmers and from tax revenues. To this 
end, the Crown Land Ordinance of 1902 had proclaimed all vacant land to be Crown 
land, which could be sold to Europeans so long as it was not occupied. However, since 
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the Masai and Kikuyu inhabitants were mobile pastoralists any narrow understanding 
of occupation would inevitably undermine the indigenous economies.63 
The High Commissioner for East Africa, Sir Charles Eliot, was concerned at the slow 
pace of settlement. He wrote to Lord Lansdowne asking him to combat ‘the widely 
spread impression that it [East Africa] is a pestilential swamp’. Contrary to those 
officials who wanted Indian settlement in East Africa (that, in the words of Sir Harry 
Johnson, it should become the America of the Hindu), Eliot insisted to Lansdowne 
that ‘the East African highlands are for the most part a White Man's country’.64 But 
the politics of land in the highlands reflected not only different visions of the future 
there but also overlapping jurisdictions within the government and different priorities 
held by the High Commissioner, some of his officials, the Foreign Office and the 
Treasury. Eliot remonstrated that his efforts to promote settlement were hindered by 
the rule that required him to refer to London any proposals to grant a tract of land 
larger than 1,000 acres. A number of settlers, he reported, had withdrawn their interest 
when confronted with officialdom in this way and he wrote home asking for ‘more 
discretion in selling land’. This was something Lansdowne could not have allowed 
even had he wanted to do so. The Treasury regarded the land as an asset that would 
increase in value with the development of British East Africa. Accordingly, it opposed 
the sale of more than the minimum required to attract permanent settlers. Under 
pressure, Lansdowne instructed Eliot to offer for sale no more than a quarter of the 
land within the railway zone.65 At the same time, Lansdowne's caution was reinforced 
by some of Eliot's subordinates, as well as by Liberals in Parliament such as David 
Lloyd George, all of whom were more sympathetic than the Commissioner to the 
Masai's need for grazing land.66  
To attract white settlers as best he could, in May 1903 Eliot publicized his intention to 
issue grants of unoccupied land at a nominal rent for ten years. The land he had in 
mind was located one mile each side of the railway and, significantly, it encompassed 
the Mau Escarpment, the area which Chamberlain (unbeknown to Eliot) had 
encouraged Greenberg and Herzl to consider as suitable for Zionist colonization.67  
At the same time, the Foreign Office discussed the possibility of bringing in Finns as 
well as Jews. It also issued 500 square miles to a private company, the East Africa 
Syndicate, allowed a grant of 100,000 acres to Lord Delamere, and entered into 
negotiations for a similarly large territory with two South African investors who 
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wanted then to sell on the land to settlers in smaller parcels. The offer to Herzl, was 
thus made in the context of other attempts to recruit white settlers to East Africa.68  
When news reached Nairobi of the offer to the Zionists the existing settler community 
reacted with extreme hostility. Although no precise offer had been made, it was 
universally assumed that the land in question was the highly desirable well-connected 
Mau escarpment south east of Nairobi. Lord Delamere immediately sent a telegram to 
The Times: ‘Feeling here very strong against introduction of alien Jews. Railway 
frontage fit for British colonisation 260 miles. Foreign Office proposes give 200 miles 
best to undesirable aliens.’69 This reference to undesirable aliens was, of course, an 
echo of the contemporaneous debate on Jewish immigration to Britain. At a protest 
meeting held in Nairobi on 29 August these connections became still clearer. Dr 
Atkinson, who had been voted to chair the meeting, rose to say that ‘it had been 
proved that Jews rendered themselves quite obnoxious to the people of every country 
they went to’; and, rhetorically, asked whether it was fair of the government to flood 
the land with ‘pauper aliens’. Another speaker had anticipated trouble with the natives 
if the Jews came. This was because the natives would soon realise that the Jews were 
‘not white men according to their own ideas but would be influenced by them and 
their low code of morals’.70  
Eliot's concerns, at one level, were more pragmatic. First, if the Protectorate did not 
begin to pay its way there was a risk that a radical government would cut its grant in 
aid. If that happened, he explained, ‘We should simply collapse, and it is better to be 
supported by Jews than to do that’. He advised Delamere, ‘the best way of practically 
defeating the Jewish scheme is to increase the number of British immigrants’.71 Eliot 
now set out both to provide the better sort of white person he wanted and also to dish 
the Jews’ project. In the autumn of 1903 he sent a representative to South Africa in a 
successful effort to recruit settlers, many of them Boers, fleeing the economic 
depression and social dislocation that followed the South African war.72 At the same 
time, Eliot proposed to the Foreign Office that if there were to be a Jewish settlement 
it should be located at a greater distance from the railway line. This, he suggested, 
would prevent ‘friction between the Jews and other European settlers’ and would help 
‘open up’ new districts, stimulate trade and so make them ‘profitable for revenue’. By 
October this idea had solidified into the proposal to offer the Jews the Uasin Gishu 
plateau in the north-west of the protectorate. Eliot conceded that he found the place 
disagreeably cold but, he imagined, the East European Jews would not.73  
In an essay published a year later Eliot explained the reasons for his opposition to 
Jewish immigration to East Africa.  
the scheme ... was tantamount to reproducing in East Africa the very 
conditions which have caused so much distress in eastern Europe – that is to 
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say the existence of a compact mass of Israelites, differing in language and 
customs from the surrounding population, to whom they are likely to be 
superior in business capacity but inferior in fighting power. To my mind it is 
best to frankly recognise that such conditions can never exist without danger to 
the public peace.74  
 
Once again, we find the debate on the legacy of Jewish emancipation and on Jewish 
immigration transposed to East Africa. There were similar concerns in London. Here 
officials deliberated whether the projected settlement would constitute an ‘imperium 
in imperio’, they commented on the ‘low level of civilisation’ among East European 
Jews, and the apparently inevitable (and regrettable) appearance of anti-Semitism 
wherever Jews settled in large numbers. Reflecting these discussions Lord Lansdowne 
echoed Eliot's concerns. He wrote: ‘I am not surprised that you should be reluctant to 
give up to a colony of Jewish settlers some of the most valuable portions of the 
Protectorate.’75  
By the end of 1903 the prospects for white settlement looked far better than they had 
in the preceding spring. In November the officer commanding British troops in the 
Protectorate noted the ‘rush for land’ while asking for 1000 acres for himself.76 Percy 
reflected this new reality when he reported to the House of Commons that all the most 
valuable land near the railway had been taken up. This was the land which in August 
and September 1903 many people had assumed to have been marked down for the 
Zionists. Greenberg was told as much in an interview at the Foreign Office in January 
1904. The only offer on the table now, he was informed, was a territory in ‘the 
remoter regions of the protectorate’.77 This was Eliot's idea of the Uasin Gishu 
plateau. The new Colonial Secretary, Alfred Lyttleton, was consulted at this point. He 
had no enthusiasm for the project but he was also complacent. He thought ‘it highly 
probable that the promoters, when they realise the enormous expense in planting a 
colony in so remote a district will scarcely desire to attempt it’.78 And so it came to 
pass. The Zionist commission sent to East Africa to survey the land in 1904 returned 
with a negative report.79  
The history of the British offer to the Zionists points the way to some answers to the 
two questions with which we began this essay: how does the postcolonial perspective 
change our understanding of the Jewish past? and, what happens to postcolonial 
studies when it encompasses the Jews? Jewish historiography has placed the East 
Africa offer in relation to internal debates within Zionism and as an episode during 
which British attitudes to the Jews were played out. The problems of colonization and 
settlement and the ways they impinged on the relationship in Europe between the 
British government and the Zionists are peripheral concerns, if they are addressed at 
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all.80 It is a perspective which fails to account for some simple but central questions 
raised by the episode: why the offer was made, why it was changed and why it failed. 
As we have seen, British policy towards the Zionists in Europe, in all its phases, was 
shaped by their overriding aim to expropriate, alienate and settle the land in East 
Africa. Moreover, Zionists such as Zangwill and Greenberg aligned themselves 
enthusiastically with the imperial project in East Africa. Strikingly and conveniently, 
Zangwill imagined East Africa simply as empty: ‘we need a land [and] East Africa 
needs a population’, he asserted.81 His concern to rescue Russian Jewry and his 
identification with the imperial project led him literally to disregard the native 
inhabitants. He was not alone in doing so. An anonymous journalist wrote in the 
Jewish Chronicle in September 1903: ‘It is land without a people to be offered to a 
people without a land ... The only inhabitants are a few nomadic Masai. The Masai are 
not a formidable element.’82 
These are ways in which the East Africa offer is illumined by some of the 
preoccupations of postcolonial historiography. It brings together the politics of 
Zionism in Europe with the dynamic of early colonial settlement in East Africa. But 
the history of the offer also exceeds this framework. In Britain and East Africa the 
presence and activities of Jews continued to provoke hostility and debate. We have 
seen this in the radical critique of the war in South Africa, in the agitation against 
Jewish immigration and in the response of white settlers to the prospect of Jewish 
settlement in East Africa. At the same time as Jews vaunted British traditions of 
liberal toleration those traditions remained under threat and their victory could not be 
taken for granted. In this vein, Zangwill denounced the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on Alien Immigration as ‘tyrannical and unEnglish’. It was, therefore, 
not only because of the predicament of Russian Jewry but also on account of their own 
dilemmas, discomforts and fears that the relationship of English Jews to colonialism 
remained in some respects a particular relationship which led them to face particular 
choices.  
However, the predicament of Russian Jewry was crucial. Zangwill, Greenberg and 
Herzl sought to bring the British Empire into play as a refuge for persecuted Jews in 
the Russian Empire. Indeed, it was for this reason that the East Africa scheme briefly 
captured the imagination of the immigrant and first-generation Jewish population in 
the East End of London.83 The contrast between the treatment of Jews in the Russian 
Empire and the constitutional and civil freedoms they enjoyed in Britain and the 
Empire was blindingly obvious and strikingly significant for Jews and non-Jews alike. 
Indeed, the notion of a backward and medieval Russia was, arguably, as significant as 
that of Darkest Africa in validating Britons’ sense of their own modernity at the start 
of the twentieth century.84  
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The ambiguous toleration of Jews in the British Empire and their physical security 
there provides a vivid contrast with the systematic discrimination and episodic 
violence which Russia imposed on its Jews. The eruption of East European Jews in 
the history of the British Empire prompts this juxtaposition and comparison. The cases 
examined in this essay suggest that the relationship of British society and the British 
Empire to the claims of toleration, representative government and the rule of law was 
uneven and subject to debate. The contours of that relationship, the outcomes of those 
contests and a comparison, from this standpoint, between the British Empire and other 
European empires all require further historical research and analysis. What seems 
clear, however, is that the sweeping contempt of some scholars for the ‘western way 
of seeing things' and their scorn for ‘the language of rights and obligations' constitute 
a poor starting point for this enquiry.  
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